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and selfish emulation of the military classes in the two countries.

These two wars furnish striking illustrations of the fact that the course alleged to be necessary for the prevention of war, is actually one of the causes of its production, as we should antecedently expect it to be.

Captain Zalinsky, as reported in the *New York Herald*, has declared his opinion that a European war is inevitable because "it is not within human nature to have keen-edged tools constantly in hand and not to use them." There is profound philosophy and sound reasoning in the remark of this shrewd and experienced military inventor. War is not prevented by extensive preparations for waging war. This is the deduction of reason and the verdict of history, whose testimony is *Si vis bellum, para bellum*.

## 2. PREPARATION FOR WAR IS NOT A GUARANTEE AGAINST THE ALARM AND APPREHENSION OF WAR.

What is the real significance of the pacific assurances, which are multiplied continually? The Emperor William of Germany has frequently reiterated his assurance, given to a British audience in the London Guildhall in the summer of 1891, that the one dominant aim of his policy is the preservation of Peace. The world has been repeatedly informed, in the name of the Czar of Russia, by those who are supposed to be most intimately acquainted with his sentiments, that his aims and wishes are resolutely pacific. In all the public utterances of satisfaction over the restored strength of the French Army, and the achievement of the *entente cordiale* with Russia, M. Carnot and his ministers have never failed to express their conviction that both these events are fresh guarantees for the maintenance of Peace. The Emperor of Austria and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Italy have, during the same period, added their assurances of Peace whenever opportunity offered.

Nevertheless, amid all these praiseworthy professions and noble sentiments, which would have sounded remarkably appropriate at our Universal Peace Congress, every one of the Powers is spending far more than it can honestly afford, and more than one of them is drawing perilously near public insolvency, in the general eagerness to perfect and increase military armaments. The mere misinterpretation of a phrase used in private conversation by the Emperor Francis Joseph, just after he had publicly expressed his confidence that there was no cause for anxiety in the immediate future, was sufficient to produce a wild panic on the Vienna Bourse, and to fill millions of his subjects with apprehensions of the imminence of War. An indiscreet remark of a military commander is sufficient to create general alarm, and has to be immediately contradicted, and so rendered harmless. Everywhere there are apprehensions and alarms engendered by a mere suspicious movement, or an ambiguous expression, or a single action or accident which embodies no hostile intention whatsoever. An ounce of fact is worth tons of theory. And the simple fact is that, not in spite of, but *because of*, these huge armaments, the European nations are watching each other's movements with feline vigilance, and a most timid and sensitive anxiety. The policy of forming great armies, and perfecting and increasing military weapons and supplies is not an insurance against the alarm of War, and therefore is not an insurance against War itself. Those who use it most glibly and effectively have no confidence in the truth of their own maxim, *Si vis pacem, para bellum*.

## 3. THESE MILITARY PREPARATIONS BECOME, IN THEMSELVES, A SOURCE OF VARIOUS DANGERS, WHICH TEND TOWARDS ACTUAL WAR.

Their very existence encourages a martial spirit; and a nation imbued with this spirit can never become truly Christian, or fully civilized. Practical infidelity and proud, even though polished, barbarism, are its essential characteristics. Military preparations for defence are always liable to be used for purposes of aggression. An imposing military establishment perpetually presents to the people the bright, attractive side of militarism, and gives constant expression to a falsehood; viz., that War is not in itself an evil, but the evidence of strength, the embodiment of high moral qualities, and the instrument of glory and goodness. War is a profession, and the army a professional caste. It must justify its existence. In Peace the soldier can hope for little or no promotion, and has no opportunity of bettering his position, or distinguishing himself. The piping times of Peace mean for him idleness and absence of opportunity, the mere decay of his energies and frustration of his ambition; so war becomes a necessary thing. Naturally the military class take a professional view of political situations, international relations and diplomatic duties. Their profession is that of arms, and it can bring them no success while the arms are unused. It is their business, therefore, to make war and their misfortune to maintain peace. Lord Aberdeen wrote in 1849: "I am disposed to dissent from that maxim which has been so generally received—that if you wish for Peace you must be prepared for war. In the state of society in which we now live, and when the warlike preparations of Great Powers are made at an enormous expense, I say that, so far from their being any security for Peace, they are directly the contrary, and tend at once to war; for it is natural that men, having adopted means they think fit and efficient to any end, should desire to put their efficiency to the test, and to have some direct results from their labor and expense."

## WAR LOANS.

BY GEORGE GILLET, OF LONDON.

*Presented to the Berne Peace Congress.*

It is a generally accepted axiom that "money is the sinew of war."

Time was when war could be undertaken at slight money cost, when a comparatively small body of armed troops was able to advance into an enemy's country, boldly relying upon securing supplies through forced contributions from the inhabitants, aided by plunder of the cattle and crops which might be found *en route*. But war as it is understood to-day involves not only enormous outlay upon the implements of destruction, but an equally formidable expenditure upon the commissariat, in order to provide food for the immense forces that are moved to the scene of carnage.

Provided that a nation has the means to equip its troops, it can almost always—however bankrupt—move its army within its own territory. When the Emperor of Russia marched the Russian Guards from St. Petersburg to the frontier of Hungary in 1849, "he sent out orders to all the landowners and farmers on the line of march commanding them to deposit, at certain points indicated, supplies of

provisions and forage for the army. When the troops arrived, these provisions were taken possession of by the commissariat, and receipts were given, which receipts were to be received as cash in payment of the taxes. So that when the taxes became due, and these receipts were handed in instead of money, it was found that the resources of the country had been all anticipated."

But the case is altogether different when such an army crosses the frontier and enters an enemy's land. They must then fight every step of the way, and, as a matter of experience, it becomes politic to supply the needful food, not by requisitions "to bring it to certain points on the line of march," but to purchase it with coin as they advance.

Enough has perhaps been said to prove that money is an integral part of war preparation, but if further testimony were required—the great "military chest" of Germany, and the millions of gold stored at the Bank of France, stand as silent but very convincing witnesses of this truth. The principle that we therefore desire to expound is this: *That the subscription to loans raised for the purpose of paying for war expenditure is equivalent to furnishing to one people the means of slaughtering another.*

We, therefore, emphatically condemn such loans. The words of Richard Cobden with reference to one such loan are strong, but precise and clear: "I say that this money now about to be raised by way of loan is just as much issued for cutting the throats of unoffending men, devastating their villages, and outraging their women, as if it had been lent before a single soldier had begun his march."

The Society of Friends in England have always discouraged their members from supplying money for purposes of war as an action compromising a Christian man with those deeds of violence and bloodshed which they believe are forbidden by our Lord Jesus Christ. As long ago as 1798, in a letter addressed to all their members, these words occur, "We entreat that when warlike preparations are making, Friends be watchful, lest any be drawn into *loans*, or arming or letting out their ships or vessels, or otherwise promoting the destruction of the human species."

Mr. Samuel Gurney, a prominent and leading financier of his day, writing to Mr. Joseph Sturge in 1849 to express his warm interest in the Peace Congress then assembled in Paris, estimated that there were about 2,000,000 able-bodied men under arms in Europe at that time, and that the annual cost of their maintenance would be about £200,000,000. "I venture," said he, "to give it as my decided judgment—a judgment formed upon some knowledge of monetary matters—that unless the nations of Europe adopt an opposite system in this respect many of them will inevitably become bankrupt, and will have to bear the disgrace and evils of such a catastrophe." In consequence of the mad rivalry of armaments that has been pursued in Europe since those words were written, the lamentable result, so correctly foreshadowed, is true to-day of several of the European nations. Their credit is gone on the Bourses of Europe, and although they may still raise loans among their own subjects by the aid of forced paper currency, they cannot place a loan on the foreign Bourses, and, therefore, cannot get gold. Year after year they have spent more than their income. They have borrowed upon future incomes of children and children's

children, till the capitalist, with reasonable cause, is hesitating to lend more. With some of them the pressure of taxation to pay for it is so great that no further taxes can be levied without risk of insurrection.

Although a certain consideration is given to their *amour propre*, committees of foreign bondholders press their claims for interest; and the humiliating alternative of meeting these claims, or the disgrace of actual bankruptcy, takes away much of their healthy independence. They have become entangled in policies which they have not the courage to withdraw from. To this deplorable state of things, the policy of peace hitherto pursued by the United States of America, with their resulting overflowing exchequer, presents a vivid and an instructive contrast.

Although in measure we rejoice that this huge system of war loans, and of mortgaging our own and our children's incomes is finding its limit, and that lapse of credit is curtailing the power of European statesmen to make war, we could more thoroughly rejoice if the difficulty of raising money by loans were due to a prevailing sentiment that the lending of money for the purpose of war, or preparation for war, was in itself wrong. "I put this question to a city man," said Richard Cobden: "Somebody asks you to lend money to build houses with, and you know it is wanted for the purpose of building infamous houses, would you be justified in lending the money?" He said, "I would." I rejoined, "Then I am not going to argue with you, you are a man for the police magistrate to look after; for if you would lend money to build infamous houses, you would very likely keep one yourself if you could get ten per cent. by it."

We must remember that law regards not only the assassin, but also his accomplice, as guilty of murder. In many of the murders in Ireland, the man who did the deed was probably only chosen by ballot the day before, and often did not know even the name of his victim. The men at headquarters were his accomplices. In like manner we read in the Bible that when Uriah was slain in battle, God, through the prophet, brought home to David the sin of that murder, with the emphatic words, "Thou art the man." David's hands were not actually stained with the blood of Uriah, nevertheless he was guilty before God. Whether a man manufactures a Gatling gun, or provides the money for its purchase, or turns the handle by which hundreds of men are slain, the guilt of either act is much the same; the actors are accomplices before God; they stand alike guilty of that shedding of blood. When peoples refuse to kill their brother-men, when individuals refuse to lend money for killing their brother-men, kings and statesmen will find it almost, if not quite impossible, to wage war.

John G. Whittier's birthplace has been bought by James H. Carleton, a wealthy citizen of Haverhill, Mass., and will be donated by him to the city, the building and grounds to be managed by a Board of Trustees and to be kept as nearly as possible in their present condition. The land comprises about thirty acres, lying five miles east of the city and a mile north of the Merrimac River. The place is of easy access to visitors by the Haverhill, Merrimac and Amesbury railroad.